Afghanistan was sealed off from the international community shortly after the Taliban assumed control of its government after taking its capital city, Kabul. By September 2021, NATO forces had fully withdrawn from Afghanistan leaving behind a disparate country reeling from the effects of a Taliban-led government and days of violence that gripped Kabul. Adding to a laundry list of problems facing the Afghan people, the United States froze the Afghan Central Bank’s nearly $9.5 billion in reserves to avoid the Taliban from acquiring its funds. In doing so, an estimated 22.8 million people were found to be on the brink of life-threatening food insecurity, with a staggering 8.7 million living in famine-like conditions. Seemingly overnight, Afghanistan witnessed billions of dollars in foreign aid vanish and its connections with the outside world dissipate as the Taliban established full control.  

Since the initial chaos settled, Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors that had shuttered Kabul out of regional discussions have resumed talks with the country’s new leaders. Cautiously, to avoid instigating tensions with the West, the Central Asian republics have sent delegations to Kabul and hinted at continuing ongoing bilateral projects. The next few months of Central Asian engagement will foreshadow Afghanistan’s return to the international stage and what that could mean for U.S. and Western foreign policy agendas in the region. 

Turkmenistan was the first Central Asian country to signal friendly relations with the Taliban. Turkmenistan deviated from other countries by refusing to evacuate its diplomatic staff from Afghanistan in the chaos of the Taliban arrival in Kabul. Ashgabat also avoided publishing any incendiary remarks about the Taliban and its leadership. Even during the first Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the 1990s, Turkmenistan had instructed its journalists to self-censor any criticism of the country’s leadership and had worked out an agreement about their shared border. Turkmenistan’s adherence to permanent neutrality has poised it to become the most Taliban-friendly country in the region. 

Even prior to the rapid takeover of Afghanistan, a Taliban delegation traveled to Ashgabat on February 6, 2021, to discuss the construction of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural-gas pipeline and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) power line, two projects that have been stalled due to financing and geopolitical issues but are central to Afghanistan’s reintegration into Central Asia. Similarly, just four days after the Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif fell to the Taliban on August 14, the Turkmen consul hosted a meeting with Taliban representatives in the city. Since the Taliban took control of the country, meetings between its leadership and Turkmenistan have remained consistent. The leader of Afghanistan’s Taliban government Mullah Hassan Akhund met in Kabul with Turkmenistan Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov in October to discuss transit cooperation. Meredov became the highest-level Central Asian official to travel to Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover. 

Turkmenistan’s main agenda in negotiating with the Taliban is ensuring that regional infrastructure plans are still underway. Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi stated that bilateral cooperation in connectivity projects was a priority for the Taliban-led government, and Turkmenistan released a similar statement expressing its readiness to work with the Taliban to oversee the completion of TAPI and TAP. Even with the willingness of both parties to further the projects, the likelihood of the projects securing stable financing from international donors is scant since international financial institutions and banks hope to avoid providing capital to the Taliban. While the Taliban currently has developed close relations with Turkmenistan, Ashgabat could give the Taliban the cold shoulder if its regional connectivity ambitions fall flat. 

Uzbekistan was quick to show that it was willing to speak with the Taliban-led government. Following the Taliban takeover of the country, Tashkent revealed that it was in daily contact with the Taliban to safeguard its own national security. Uzbekistan also returned hundreds of Afghan refugees fleeing the oppressive regime to evade reprimand from the Taliban. Even those who received permission to stay in the country face uncertainty and the threat of deportation. In November, Uzbekistan issued a decree saying that it would not accept any more Afghan refugees, dealing a blow to those wishing to escape Taliban rule. 

Uzbekistan is cautiously reopening talks with the Taliban to prevent any economic disruptions. On September 20, 2021, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s special representative on Afghanistan, Ismatulla Irgashev, released a statement indicating that Uzbekistan aimed to bolster road and railway connections with Afghanistan. Moreover, a Taliban delegation led by Hanafi met with an Uzbek delegation under Deputy Prime Minister Sardor Umurzakov on October 16 in the border town of Termez to discuss the resumption of trade and economic interaction between the two countries. Uzbek businesses on the shared Afghan-Uzbek border have also adapted to trade with Taliban representatives. 

In October 2021, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan both opened their own channels of communication with the Taliban. Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said that Kazakhstan was ready to establish “business contacts with Afghanistan” on September 9 and promoted initiating an informal dialogue with Taliban leaders at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Dushanbe on September 17. More recently, Kazakhstani Trade and Integration Minister Bakhyt Sultanov led a delegation to Kabul to discuss resuming direct flights and establishing a mutual chamber of commerce between Afghanistan and Kazakhstan. In a similar fashion, deputy chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Security Council, Taalatbek Masadykov, and the head of the Kyrgyzstan presidential administration’s foreign policy department, Jeenbek Kulubaev, traveled to Kabul to speak about Bishkek’s security and economic concerns with the Taliban in charge in September. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan’s relations with the Taliban are less enthusiastic than those of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan but surely less antagonistic than Tajikistan’s. 

Tajikistan has remained the most steadfast in its opposition to the Taliban-led government. The Tajik-Afghan border spans about 835 miles through the Badakhshan borderland region, a likely reason for maintaining its stark opposition to the Taliban. Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon would suffer politically if large numbers of Taliban troops gathered at the southern border. Moreover, Tajikistan is likely concerned that a Taliban-led regime would precipitate the flow of illicit drugs across its porous border. Shortly after the Taliban assumed control of the country, Rahmon reaffirmed his stance, stating that Tajikistan would never recognize a Taliban-led government, citing that ethnic Tajiks comprise over 46 percent of Afghanistan’s population. Furthermore, prominent Afghan opponents of the Taliban, such as the leader of the National Resistance Front in the Panjshir Valley, Ahmad Massoud; the leader of the Afghan National Congress Party, Abdul Latif Pedram; and the ex-Vice President Amrullah Saleh, found sanctuary in Dushanbe. 

Nevertheless, even Tajikistan might soon shift its hardline stance against the Taliban. If Tajikistan’s neighbors continue to broaden diplomatic relations with the Taliban, Tajikistan would be frozen out of regional discussions, dealing an even more significant blow to Rahmon’s status back home. Moreover, Tajikistan and Afghanistan signed an electricity supply contract in December 2021 to prevent a humanitarian crisis from unfolding in Afghanistan as winter months loom over villages with inadequate electricity supply, underscoring that Tajikistan’s hostilities towards the Taliban will only extend so far. Overall, the Central Asian republics are carefully establishing informal diplomatic ties with the Taliban to bypass any economic disruptions that could result from isolating Afghanistan completely. Moreover, countries sharing a border with Afghanistan are anxious to receive assurances from the Taliban that Afghanistan will respect existing borders. The Taliban has already issued demands that Tajikistan and Uzbekistan return planes and helicopters used to evacuate troops and citizens last summer. With this in mind, the United States will eventually have to adjust its foreign policy stance to work with a Central Asia that has to work realistically with a Taliban-led government in Afghanistan. While no country worldwide has officially recognized the Taliban leadership since the insurgents took over, it will grow increasingly more difficult to find regional partners that are as firmly opposed to the Taliban as Washington is.